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AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON RETAIL GASOLINE PRICE SEASONALITY
MICHAEL C. DAVIS
Stricter environmental standards on gasoline have had impacts on the prices of
gasoline including the seasonality of gasoline prices. Using both national data and
individual station data, the paper tests for a possible explanation for this increase.
Three theories are tested: that gasoline seasonality increases due to higher costs, due
to greater market power because of segmented markets, or due to greater asymmetry
because of greater inattention on the part of customers. The results suggest that gasoline
price seasonality has increased both due to higher costs and greater market power with
mixed results on the inattention of consumers. (JEL Q41, Q53, Q58).
I. INTRODUCTION
An issue of particular importance to
researchers and policymakers in the current
century has been the rise in gasoline prices.
In addition to prices rising sharply beginning
in 2005, there has also been a dramatic rise in
the seasonal variation of prices which has been
much more acute since 2000. Figure 1 shows
the difference between the national average June
and January gasoline prices. From 1983 to 1999
there was variation from year to year, but the
difference hovered around 10 cents. Between
2000 and 2013, there was a sharp increase in the
difference, regularly being over 20 cents.
We examine one specific suspect for the cause
of this increase, the Reformulated Gasoline Pro-
gram (RFG). In 2000, Phase II of the RFG pro-
gram went into effect. This regulation placed
more stringent environmental requirements on
gasoline. In particular, these requirements are
more stringent during the summer than the winter.
Studies looking at gasoline price seasonality
prior to 2000 find little evidence in support of
seasonality. Davis and Hamilton (2004) find no
evidence in support of seasonality, and Chouinard
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and Perloff (2007) find statistically significant
but small evidence of seasonality. Davis (2009)
examines seasonal adjustment of monthly aver-
age retail prices and finds that there is sub-
stantially more variation in prices since 2000
than before. However, because of the lack of
data available, as the post 2000 sample only
included up to 2004, he does not find that the
monthly dummy variables are significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
In addition to Davis’s (2009) examination
of the seasonal components associated with the
RFG program, other studies have found price
effects of the RFG program. Bulow et al. (2003)
showed that the initiation of the RFG program
was partially responsible for the price spikes
that happened in the Midwest in 2000. Muehleg-
ger (2006) found that the RFG program caused
larger price spikes in Wisconsin, Illinois, and
California, while Chakravorty, Nauges, and
Thomas (2008) found that wholesale prices
increased in response to the RFG program.
An additional concern associated with the
RFG program is that many states imposed their
own specific requirements on gasoline prices.
Walls and Rusco (2007) found that areas with
the most unique requirements typically have the
highest prices. Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011)
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FIGURE 1
June January Gasoline Price Difference (1976–2013)
found that while costs are higher with the various
state standards that the specific strict standards
of California had a positive impact on ozone
gas reduction, while federal standards had very
little impact.
The finding of increased seasonality is impor-
tant for researchers. In previous work the pres-
ence of seasonality was found not to exist or to be
negligible, so researchers could ignore the impli-
cations of it. But in data from recent years, the
seasonal variation is large enough that ignoring it
when examining gasoline prices will likely cause
error in their work.
Seasonality is also important for public policy
decisions. It may be the case that there are very
good environmental reasons for different stan-
dards during the summer and winter. As shown by
Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) there may also
be good reasons for geographical variations in the
strictness of the policies. However, if there are
not good reasons, perhaps these programs should
be changed so that they are more efficient. Also
policy changes based on high gasoline prices
should not be made because of short term fluctu-
ations in June which will be corrected in October.
Policymakers need to be aware of the seasonal
pattern so that they do not make misguided short
term corrections with long term impacts.
This study conducts two empirical analyses
to examine whether the seasonality changed and
whether the RFG program is responsible. The
first analysis is to re-estimate the Davis (2009)
study using national data and an error-correction
model (ECM). The main limitation of the Davis
study was the availability of the data only up to
2004, whereas this study updates the data to 2013.
The second study is to investigate retail gaso-
line stations in six zip codes across the United
States. This data allows us to test for differences
in responses across areas under different regula-
tory conditions.
II. RFG PROGRAM
The 1990 Clean Air Act includes provisions
for emission standards for motor gasoline. One
of these programs is the RFG program. The RFG
program is designed to reduce smog as well as
toxic chemicals from gasoline emissions. Phase
I of the program went into effect in December of
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1994. The EPA estimates that Phase I has reduced
emissions of the chemicals leading to smog by
17% and toxic pollutants by 22% (Environmental
Protection Agency 1999a). Phase II of the RFG
program went into place in January 2000 and
placed even more stringent standards in order to
reduce both smog and toxic emissions even more.
Phase II of the RFG program made stricter
the emissions standards with regards to three
pollutants: Toxic Air Pollutants, Volatile Organic
Compounds, and Nitrogen Oxides. Of these,
only the requirements for Toxic Air Pollutants
became more stringent year round. For the other
two pollutants, the requirements placed much
more stringent requirements during the summer.
Since the requirements are much more strin-
gent in the summer than winter, we expect an
increase in seasonality in gasoline prices. For
more information on the environmental impact
of the RFG program, see the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (1999a, 1999b)
and Linderdale and Bohn (1999).
Linderdale and Bohn (1999) estimate that
Phase II of the RFG program would add 2.5 cents
per gallon in RFG areas in the winter, 4 cents
in the RFG Northern areas in the summer and
3.5 cents in RFG Southern states in the summer.
These estimates suggest an increase in season-
ality of 1 or 1.5 cents per gallon for areas under
the RFG program and no suggestion of increased
prices in non-RFG areas. So while these effects
are predictable, the increase in seasonality is
much greater than the a priori estimates.
There are a few reasons why we might see
higher seasonality in fuel prices since the impo-
sition of stricter standards. First, the gasoline
under the stricter standard would be more expen-
sive to produce. Some of that increase in costs
would naturally be passed on to the consumer in
the form of higher prices. The firms can achieve
the higher environmental standards by mixing
their gasoline with either ethanol or MTBE. At
the same time the RFG standards were being
put in place, and for the following years, many
states started putting in place bans on MTBE.
The increased usage of ethanol would exacerbate
the cost impacts of the standards as the ethanol
is more expensive (Anderson and Elzinga 2014).
One impact demonstrating the degree of impor-
tance of this change is the finding of Tenkorang
et al. (2015) that the increased use of ethanol in
blending has led to ethanol and gasoline being
complements as opposed to the substitutes they
used to be. Also, the RFG fuel seems to get
lower gas mileage (Linderdale and Bohn 1999).
The lower gas mileage would increase demand,
at least partially, leading to higher prices. It is
not clear however that this effect has a seasonal
component, as it might just be result of the RFG
gasoline and not specifically the RFG summer or
winter gasoline.
A second scenario is that the different stan-
dards could lead to greater market power for
the gasoline producers (Brown et al., 2008;
Chakravorty, Nauges, and Thomas 2008; Walls
and Rusco 2007). The different types of gasoline
required for different areas could cause the indi-
vidual markets for each gasoline type to be small.
This problem is exacerbated by the extensive
and differing state and local regulations. There
are extensive economies of scale in gasoline
production, making it very difficult to produce
a small amount of gasoline of a particular type.
Combining these two issues suggests that when
the regulations are in place there should be an
increase in price.
A third theory is that there could also be
switch over costs associated with producing
gasoline. We might see jumps in the price in
March/April and August/September as they
switch from winter gasoline to summer gasoline
and back again. During these months, many firms
run down inventories to make way for the other
type of gasoline (Bulow et al. 2003).
Most of the above reasons specifically relate
to price changes at the refined or wholesale
(or rack) level. When examining retail data,
we should expect most of the price effect to
be passed through from the wholesale price
to the consumers. However, an additional effect
at the retail level could be that firms are less
likely to change their prices. In particular,
they may start to exhibit a more pronounced
asymmetric pattern to their prices.
There are a number of reasons we might see
an increased asymmetry in gasoline prices from
the RFG program. Borenstein, Cameron, and
Gilbert (1997) suggest that an increase in asym-
metry may be caused by inventory constraints.
When faced with a downward shock, the firms
simply keep prices the same and sell less, but
when faced with an upward shock they must react
immediately and possibly run out of gasoline.
The requirements on selling particular fuels at
certain times of year may lead firms to optimally
keep lower inventories, exacerbating the inven-
tory constraint. If the higher input prices drive
retailers out of the market, market power could
increase, which could lead to greater asymmetry
(Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert 1997; Brown
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and Yücel 2000). Douglas and Herrera (2010)
discuss the possibility of Reis’s (2006) ratio-
nal inattention on the parts of consumers lead-
ing to an increase in asymmetry for gasoline
prices. Firms make more small upward changes
in their price, which consumers do not bother to
check if it is still the lowest price. In this case,
the increased wholesale prices are exacerbated
because a slightly larger change in price is now a
smaller percentage change in price from the point
of view of the consumers.
One specific example of the costs associated
with being rationally inattentive is search costs.
Davis (2007) found evidence of search costs hav-
ing an impact on gasoline price asymmetry for
retail stations. Tappata (2009) developed a model
of search which showed that asymmetry should
increase with production cost. During the RFG
period production costs should be higher. We
should therefore see higher asymmetry. Since the
asymmetry could lead to higher prices than lower
prices, the firms could see an increase in margins.
The absence of a change in asymmetric pattern
would not be conclusive of the lack of search
costs, as other models of search would not sug-
gest such an increase (Lewis 2011).
We therefore propose four possible explana-
tions for the increased seasonality.
1. Increased cost of the gasoline that is pro-
duced. If the primary driver of the increased sea-
sonality is cost increases then the cost increases
should be almost exclusively seen by the stations
under the RFG program.
2. Market segmentation and market power. If
this explanation is the primary reason then the
impact will be seen by both the RFG and non-
RFG stations.
3. Switch over costs. If switch over costs are a
significant portion of the cost, the impact should
show up most dramatically in the spring and fall
months.
4. Retail firms having higher prices because
of rationally inattentive consumers. We would
then expect to see two things. One would be an
increased asymmetric pattern on the part of the
firms. In particular firms could be increasing their
prices more than decreasing them. Then, the firms
that see the greatest increase in seasonality should
be those that exhibit a change in asymmetric pat-
tern. Second we would expect to see an increase
in the margins of the retail stations.
III. METHODOLOGY
For this study we employ three methodologies.
A. OLS
For both the monthly national data and the
daily individual stations, we test to see if there
is any change in seasonality by regressing the
price on monthly dummy variables, using the
following regression:
(1) ΔPGt = α + γ
′Xt + εt
where PGt is the price of gasoline and Xt is a vector
of seasonal dummies.
For the individual stations, we also examine
the pattern of seasonality in the markup of retail
prices over wholesale prices. For the national data
series, we examine the pattern of seasonality of
the oil prices to see whether the seasonal pattern
is also exhibited upstream.
B. Error Correction Model
In trying to examine how much of the pattern
is due to changes in the pattern in oil prices, we
control for oil prices by using an ECM originally
developed by Engle and Granger (1987). This
approach used by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003)
to examine the responses of gasoline prices(PGt )
to oil prices (POt )uses the following system of
equations:
(2) PGt = α + βP
O
t + zt







+ β4ΔPGt−2 + θzt−1 + γ
′Xt + εt
where the residual of the first equation (zt) is used
as an explanatory variable in the second equation.
The inclusion of monthly dummies (Xt) into
the second equation was added by Davis (2009).
We will use Davis’s model but with a slightly
different time span to see if the results still exist
with the extended data set.
C. Logit
With monthly average data, the price is chang-
ing every day. With daily retail prices, there are
many days on which the firms do not change
prices. For these data, an ECM which assumes
a constantly changing price would be inappro-
priate. For data of this type, Davis and Hamil-
ton (2004) and Davis (2007) find that a logit
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model fits the data well. The logit is as follows:









Specifically, we will test whether there is a
change in behavior in the way that firms change
their prices not under the RFG summer program
and under the RFG summer program. We look at
the response of the data to the gap between the
actual gasoline price and the frictionless gasoline




θit, θit(Pi,t − P∗i,t−m), (1 − θit),(5)
−(1 − θit)(Pi,t − P∗i,t−m),
θit ∗ RFGsummer, (1 − θit) ∗ RFGsummer]′
where θit is a variable that is 1 if the gap between
the price (P) and the frictionless price (P*) is
positive and 0 otherwise. A new inclusion in
this model is the allowance for a difference in
reaction to the RFG summer period, the months
in 2000 and 2001 in which the RFG program is
in force. m represents the number of days since
the last observation. If the number of days since
the last observation exceeds three, then it is not
used in the analysis. The most likely days to be
missed from the data collection are Saturdays and
Sundays which are also probably the days least
likely to see a price change. A 3-day gap seems a
reasonable compromise to keep the Monday data
in the data set.
The frictionless price is derived using the pre-
dicted values from the following regression:
PGt = α + β1P
W
1 + γ
′Xt + δ ∗ RFG
+ λ′Xt ∗ RFG + εt(6)
where (PGt ) is the retail station’s price of gaso-
line, (PWt ) is the wholesale price, Xt is a vector
of dummy variables representing the months and
RFG is a dummy variable that is 1 in the years
that the RFG is in effect (2000 and 2001). This
equation varies from that of Davis (2007) in that
it includes seasonal effect in calculating the fric-
tionless price. The change is necessitated by the
findings of Davis (2009) and in the work here.
One series of variables that might make sense
to include in the price, the days of the week,
has been shown not to be significant in the price
of gasoline (Hall, Lawson, and Raymer 2007).
However, Davis (2010) did show that these vari-
ables can significantly affect the probability of a
price change, but we exclude the variables to keep
the number of estimated parameters low given the
small sample sizes.
IV. DATA
The gasoline prices for the entire United States
are monthly average gasoline prices collected
by the Energy Information Agency (EIA). The
sample runs from 1976 to 2013. The oil prices
are first purchase prices of crude oil, a monthly
series also collected by the EIA.
The individual station gasoline prices were
obtained from Oil Price Information Services
(OPIS). The data contain individual stations’
daily prices, including the wholesale price, the
retail price, and the margin.
We are analyzing stations from six zip codes.
The zip codes represent sections of six cities,
Charleston, SC, Lansdale, PA, Scranton, PA, Nor-
folk, VA, Rolla, MO, and St. Louis, MO. Three
of the areas would be subject to the require-
ments of the RFG program. Norfolk, VA and St.
Louis, MO are subject to the standards of the RFG
South program. Lansdale, PA, which is a sub-
urb in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, is sub-
ject to the RFG North program. The other three
cities are not subject to the RFG. The expensive-
ness of the data limits the analysis to these six
cities, which is common in these types of studies
(Davis 2007; Davis and Hamilton 2004; Douglas
and Herrera 2010).
The six cities are not chosen at random,
but selected for particular reasons. First, states
with local regulations or the Oxygenated Gaso-
line (OXY) program are excluded to keep the
effects specific to the RFG program. The OXY
program is a similar program to the RFG gaso-
line program, but designed to provide more
environmentally-friendly gasoline in the winter
months as opposed to the summer months. Cities
west of the Rocky Mountains are excluded as
well because they tend to follow a different
pattern of pricing relative to gas stations east of
the Rockies. Charleston is selected because it
represents one of the larger cities not effected by
the RFG program. Norfolk is selected because
it makes a nice parallel with Charleston but
is subject to the RFG program. The Norfolk
metropolitan area is larger than Charleston, but
like Charleston it is a Southern port city. Another
pair of cities is selected from Pennsylvania.
Lansdale gives us a suburban city that is subject
to the RFG regulation, while Scranton is a small
city not subject to regulations. The last pair
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TABLE 1
Description of Individual Stations’ Retail Prices
Label City Brand RFG
Number





Charleston 1 Charleston BP None 859 122.26 Pantry 113.20 140.51
Charleston 2 Charleston Hess None 798 119.79 Ashley River 110.88 138.13
Rolla 1 Rolla Phillips 66 None 743 115.08 MPC50 105.82 140.20
Rolla 2 Rolla Unbranded None 794 118.27 Delano 108.20 141.36
Scranton 1 Scranton BP None 880 129.64 Unimarts 121.45 151.75
Scranton 2 Scranton Sunoco None 838 132.41 S7th 124.69 150.35
Scranton 3 Scranton Sunoco None 1,007 131.61 Stafford 123.37 152.10
Lansdale 1 Lansdale Gulf RFG North 833 127.88 North Penn 117.42 151.19
Norfolk 1 Norfolk Texaco RFG South 948 125.01 Suffolk 116.02 150.54
St. Louis 1 St. Louis Shell RFG South 726 126.32 Spirit 114.98 149.14
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
TABLE 2
Description of Individual Stations’ Rack Prices
Label City Brand RFG
Number





Charleston 1 Charleston BP None 859 73.38 Pantry 65.68 88.88
Charleston 2 Charleston Hess None 798 73.04 Ashley River 65.61 88.32
Rolla 1 Rolla Phillips 66 None 743 73.36 MPC50 64.28 98.04
Rolla 2 Rolla Unbranded None 794 75.83 Delano 65.94 98.53
Scranton 1 Scranton BP None 880 70.17 Unimarts 62.86 89.91
Scranton 2 Scranton Sunoco None 838 73.53 S7th 66.76 89.27
Scranton 3 Scranton Sunoco None 1,007 71.39 Stafford 64.16 89.36
Lansdale 1 Lansdale Gulf RFG North 833 75.13 North Penn 65.84 95.84
Norfolk 1 Norfolk Texaco RFG South 948 72.47 Suffolk 63.61 97.61
St. Louis 1 St. Louis Shell RFG South 726 82.04 Spirit 70.10 106.07
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
comes from Missouri, where we have the small
rural city of Rolla, not subject to RFG regula-
tions, combined with St. Louis which is subject
to the regulations. Both cities (and specifically
the part of the city in St. Louis which is selected)
are located along the same Intestate, I-44. Since
the data is supplied by zip code, we chose zip
codes that we hoped would have many gasoline
stations in them.
The quality of the data is quite uneven. Many
of the individual stations do not have a large num-
ber of observations. We restrict the sample to
only those stations which have at least 694 obser-
vations, representing at least 2/3 of the week-
days during the four-year period. Table 1 pro-
vides summary statistics for the retail prices from
the ten gasoline stations that are analyzed. Table 2
presents the same data for the rack prices that
those stations pay for their gasoline. There is no
apparent pattern relating the RFG program to the
average price, which is to be expected. State and
local factors, in particular taxes, will outweigh
the importance of the RFG program when analyz-
ing means. However, when comparing the prices
during the RFG program months (the 2000 and
2001 summers) to the prices not during those
periods, there does seem to be a difference in
the change in prices. The non-RFG stations in
Charleston and Scranton experience a smaller
jump in both rack and retail prices than the RFG
stations in Lansdale, Norfolk and St. Louis.
Interestingly, the Rolla stations exhibit a pat-
tern similar to the RFG stations. One possibility
is that Rolla is using the RFG gasoline obtained
from wholesalers in St. Louis. Rolla is only
100 miles from St. Louis and is not large enough
to have its own wholesalers. We examine the
correlation coefficient between the Phillips 66-
branded Rolla 1 station and two other Phillips 66-
branded stations in St. Louis. The two St. Louis
stations’ wholesale rack prices are perfectly cor-
related. Rolla 1’s rack prices have correlation
coefficients of .982 and .994 with the two St.
Louis stations. The lack of perfect correlation,
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TABLE 3





























































































































































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The gasoline data are measured in cents per gallon and the oil data are in cents per barrel.
Source: Energy Information Agency.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
while the two St. Louis stations have perfect cor-
relation, leaves open whether the Rolla station is
getting its wholesale gasoline from St. Louis.
There are obviously a number of missing days
in each series. In order to determine whether a
change in price took place, we examine the price
relative to the price from the preceding observa-
tion. This process is different from the assump-
tions made by Davis (2007) when working with
OPIS data.
V. RESULTS
A. National Gasoline Results
We re-estimate the models from Davis (2009)
to examine whether adding nine more years
of data changes the results with regard to
the increase in seasonality. Table 3 presents
the results of the regression equation using
Equation (1) explained above. The three gasoline
columns are broken into separate time peri-
ods: 1976–2013, 1976–1999 and 2000–2013.
These time periods vary from Davis’s trio of
1974–2004, 1974–1999 and 2000–2004.1 The
results show the same pattern with regard to
increasing seasonality. The same regression is
performed on oil prices. The results for those
regressions can be found in columns 4–6. Again
the results confirm Davis’s earlier finding of
greater seasonality in oil prices since 2000.
Table 4 uses the error-correction framework
shown in Equations (2) and (3). These results
show that there is an increase in gasoline-price
seasonality beyond what can be attributed to
oil prices.
B. Individual Gasoline Station Results
Table 5 presents the results of unit root test-
ing on the individual stations. Unit root testing
is non-standard because of the missing data.
The approach used here follows Ryan and
Giles (1998) suggestion of interpolating the data
by treating any missing observation as being the
1 The difference in time periods relates to slight differ-
ences in the data available at the time from the Energy Infor-
mation Agency.
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TABLE 4














































































































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The gasoline data
are measured in cents per gallon.
Source: Energy Information Agency.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at
1%.
same as the previous day’s observation and then
conducting the unit root test.
Five of the ten firms have p values below .1
and the other five firms have fairly low p val-
ues as well. The usual solution for unit roots of
differencing the data is not a good solution here
because of the missing data. Therefore, we pro-
ceed with the analysis using the data in levels.
For the individual stations we regress the retail
price and the margin on monthly dummies and a
constant to see if there is a seasonal pattern. We
break up the sample into two time periods, before
and after the RFG program is in place. First we
examine the behavior of the prices (Tables 6–8).
TABLE 5













Note: p values of Dickey-Fuller test with one lagged term
and drift. Source: Oil Price Information Services.
All of the stations show an increase in seasonality.
The results do vary somewhat with regard to
when the seasonality begins but in general all
show prices peaking in the summer months.
The results for the margins are presented in
Tables 9–11. Only three of the stations show an
increase in the seasonality of gasoline price mar-
gins. Two of them are in areas in which the RFG
program is in place. The station in Lansdale and
the station in Norfolk show a significant pattern
of seasonality in the price margin in the later
sample. Amongst the non-RFG affected areas,
only Rolla 2 shows an increase in seasonality
in the margin and it is not as dramatic as for
the two RFG affected areas. The rest of the sta-
tions in Charleston, Rolla and Scranton do not
show much of a change in seasonality in the
margins. The St. Louis station, unlike the other
RFG affected stations does not show an increase
in seasonality.
After estimating the logit model of Equations
(4–6), the probability of a change is calculated
for price differences between −20 and+ 20
cents. Since the price differences represent the
actual minus the expected, a negative value
implies a likely price increase, while a positive
value implies a price decrease. In Figures 2–4,
we present the findings for each station side-by-
side. The results show a pretty mixed picture
with some firms exhibiting the standard asym-
metry of raising their prices faster than they
lower them. Some stations exhibit a reverse
asymmetry, being more likely to make small
upward changes and large downward changes.
This result is usually explained by assuming that
firms are worried about upsetting their customers
(see Davis 2007; Davis and Hamilton 2004;
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TABLE 6





























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
TABLE 7





























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
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TABLE 8

















































































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
TABLE 9





























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
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TABLE 10





























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
TABLE 11

















































































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Oil Price Information Services.
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Douglas and Herrera 2010). When comparing
the RFG periods to the non-RFG periods, most
of the firms moved toward greater likelihood
of raising prices than lowering them, including
Lansdale, Norfolk, Charleston 1 and all three
Scranton stations.
VI. DISCUSSION
We support previous findings that there has
been an increase in seasonality in gasoline prices.
The results from the individual gasoline stations
also suggest that the seasonality is much more
prevalent in 2000 and 2001 than in 1998 and
1999, supporting the contention that Phase II of
the RFG program increased the seasonal variation
in gasoline prices.
Wholesale price increases seem to be the pri-
mary cause for the retail price increases, as many
of the firms increase their prices, but do not
increase their margins during the summer. There
is evidence in support of the cost increase story
at the wholesale level as the RFG firms experi-
ence the greatest increase in their wholesale price.
However, all of the firms exhibit an increase in
their wholesale prices as shown by the increase
in the retail prices much more than the increases
in the margins. Therefore, there is also evidence
in support of the market power explanation since
the non-RFG stations are not required to sell a
specific gasoline in the summer and should only
see prices rise due to market segmentation.
There are some interesting results at the
retail level as suggested by the price margins.
Two firms increased their margins, but at the
same time increased their probability of making
upward changes relative to downward ones.
Since these two stations are RFG stations, there
is some support for the rational inattention
of consumer theory. Since they are the sta-
tions selling the more expensive gasoline, the
RFG stations would be the ones most likely
to fit the criteria of the Tappata (2009) model.
St. Louis, the third RFG station, however,
clearly does not support this pattern. It does
not show an increased seasonality in margins
and actually shows a greater likelihood of
lowering prices during the RFG years than the
earlier years.
There may be some support to the switch-over
theory at least as it relates to the spring change.
While the fall-switching month of October is not
very large in its seasonal coefficient, the spring-
switching month of April has one of the largest
month coefficients for both the national data and
the individual RFG station data. Also March has
the highest prices of the non-RFG months, so
the stations may be raising prices as they run
down supplies in anticipation of having to switch
to the RFG-compliant gasoline. Lastly we might
expect that the switchover costs would be higher
for the spring than the fall, since the stations can
continue to sell the higher-quality gasoline even
in the winter. They have to switch in the spring;
they do not have to switch in the fall.
The overall results point to increased costs as
at least as one of the primary causes. The impact
on seasonality seems to come in most clearly
through the wholesale prices, and the jump in
seasonality is strongest with the RFG stations.
The Rolla stations exhibit stronger seasonality
than the other non-RFG locations and the Rolla
stations are the ones most likely would be getting
their gasoline from an RFG wholesaler given
their proximity to St. Louis.
While the evidence does seem to support the
idea of increased seasonality, it does not prove
that the cause of that increased seasonality is
from environmental regulations. Davis (2007)
discusses two other possible causes of the
increased seasonality, natural gasoline price
increases and increased driving due to 9/11.
The paper rejects both alternative hypotheses.
The natural gasoline explanation is based on
the idea that there was a price spike in natural
gasoline prices in 2000. However, Serletis and
Rangel-Ruiz (2004) show that there is little con-
nection between natural gasoline and crude oil.
Davis (2007) also rejects the driving hypothesis
because while air travel increased, car travel did
not change dramatically following 9/11. Also the
pattern still remains many years later despite the
impact of 9/11 on traveling having dissipated.
Other long-term impacts on gasoline such
as ride sharing or alternative-fuel vehicles
could influence gasoline prices. However,
those impacts would be long-term changes
and would not have any short-term influence
as exhibited in 2000 and 2001 relative to
1998 and 1999. Also while likely influenc-
ing gasoline prices in general, those impacts
would not have an obvious impact on seasonal
prices.
VII. CONCLUSION
We find support for increasing seasonality of
gasoline prices following the imposition of the
RFG Phase II program. We find some evidence
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supporting both the increasing costs of produc-
ing RFG gasoline and increasing market power
of retailers through increases in wholesale gaso-
line prices. There also seems to be a substantial
change in price dynamics at the retail level, but
not one with a notable pattern across stations.
Two stations seem to have evidence supporting
the theory that the asymmetry increased during
the RFG period and showed a substantial increase
in its markup over wholesale prices. However, the
third RFG station showed opposite results. There-
fore we find mixed results in support of prices
being higher due to firms charging higher prices
due to search costs changing. Lastly we also find
mixed support for the explanation of switch-over
costs, as prices are higher in March and April but
not in September and October.
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FIGURE 4
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The impact of the seasonality leads to higher
prices for consumers. The margins for the sum-
mer gasoline during the RFG program are higher
than the margins during the periods when the
RFG program is not in effect, whether that is the
winters after 2000 or any time before 2000. How-
ever, the higher prices may be efficient as pre-
sumably the program was put in place because
the environmental impacts are more severe during
the summer. The increased costs may be helping
to reflect the true social cost of driving in summer
relative to winter.
Future work should attempt to expand the
analysis of the impact on prices to other environ-
mental regulations. This study specifically picked
locations that had neither individual state regula-
tions nor the OXY program in place, but those
regulations might impact seasonality as well. In
particular the impact of the OXY program would
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be a natural extension since that program places
stricter regulations in the winter months.
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES
Monthly United States Gasoline Prices: Energy Informa-
tion Agency.
Monthly United States Crude Oil Prices: Energy Informa-
tion Agency.
Individual Station Daily Retail Prices: Oil Price Informa-
tion Services.
Individual Station Daily Rack Prices: Oil Price Informa-
tion Services.
Individual Station Daily Margins: Oil Price Informa-
tion Services.
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